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Abstract 
China has taken over Japan over the last decade to become the largest manufacturer 
and exporter of more than one hundred consumer products. However, China, as “the 
world factory”, has yet to create a single brand that is recognised worldwide. The 
recent acquisition of IBM’s PC business by China’s Lenovo may signal the beginning 
of the globalisation of Chinese brands. This paper considers the current brand 
revolution in China, focusing on the unique challenge faced by major Chinese 
enterprises: how to sustain their brands in domestic competition and how to expand in 
the global markets. The paper is divided into two parts: it first gives a brief review of 
the development of marketing and branding in China since the start of economic 
reform in 1978, and then discusses current issues in the domestic market: changes 
from price competition to brand competition, as well as diversification and the role of 
the government. The second part examines the routes to internationalisation taken by 
some of China’s biggest brands; differences in their entry modes and branding 
strategies are analysed.  
 
 
Introduction 
It is now difficult to find a shop in the West that does not sell products with a Made-
in-China label. China has taken over Japan within the last decade to become the 
largest manufacturer and exporter of consumer goods, from toys to clothes and shoes, 
from telephones to television and DVD players. The growth in foreign trade since 
1978 has maintained an average of 15%. It is said that China is now the world’s 
number one producer in more than one hundred different consumer products. 
However, as “the world factory”, China has yet to create a single brand that is 
recognised worldwide. This paper will discuss the current brand revolution in China, 
focusing on the unique challenge faced by major Chinese enterprises: how to sustain 
their brands in domestic competition and how to expand in the global market. Key 
issues that affect brand transformation and internationalisation have been identified 
using six case examples such as Haier (white goods), Changhong, SVA and TCL 
(television), Lenovo (PC) and Galanz (microwave oven). The research for this paper 
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is conducted mainly on the Internet by searching various websites including those of 
six companies featured. A useful source of information is www.globrand.com (in 
Chinese) where more than four hundred articles were surveyed. 
 
China has had a long history in commerce and marketing. The world’s first print 
advertisement dates back to the Northern Song Dynasty (960-1127).  It was for Liu’s 
Needle Workshop in Jinan City, Shandong Province. The first European 
advertisement, a British Bible poster, did not appear until three hundred years later in 
1473 (China Daily, 03/03/2004). Throughout history, “Made-in-China” was for many 
centuries a label for high quality and prestige, and imported exclusively for the royals 
and the rich. When China’s economy went into a long decline in the 19th century the 
reputation of Chinese-made products started to suffer and has yet to make a full 
recovery. Contemporary advertising in China dates back to the 1920s. Since then it 
has experienced many ups and downs. Examples dating from the 1920s to 1940s 
include the calendar posters produced in Shanghai. These ads featuring beautiful 
women are now sought after as collector’s items. After the first advertising boom in 
the 1930s, the advertising industry suffered restrictions when the communists founded 
the People’s Republic in 1949 and began to implement a Russian-style centrally 
planned economy. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), being branded as evil 
and deceptive, advertising virtually disappeared. It returned to business in 1978 when 
China started the economic reform and “open-door policy”. However, even in the 
dark days of the Cultural Revolution some brands such as Panda radios and Flying 
Pigeon bicycles survived and remained as sought-after products. The last decade in 
the 20th century has witnessed dramatic growth in the sector with average annual 
growth rates of 39.8 %. The total advertising revenue has increased more than 31 
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times from 2.5 billion RMB to 79.5 billion RMB (US$ 10 billion) between 1990 and 
2001 (Economic Daily, 06/11/2002), taking China into the top ten largest markets for 
advertising services. 
 
Does China have world-class brands? 
Does China have any brands as they are understood in western terms? According to 
Shelly Lazarus, CEO of Ogilvy & Mather in a recent interview, in China there are 
only brand names no real brands. Even Lenovo and Haier are not brands but brand 
names that “aspire to be brands”.  Chinese companies “think branding is important, 
and they want to understand what a brand is. But they don’t have any experience” 
(Business Week, 10/11/2004). This comment may sound quite harsh, but is largely 
true. Miles Young, co-chairman of Ogilvy & Mather Asia Pacific made similar 
comment “brands don’t exist in Korea” (Sudhaman, 2004). The majority of brands in 
China today are no more than well-known names. They lack a key attribute in a real 
brand. There is yet a single Chinese brand that is recognised worldwide. “Giants with 
feet of clay “- this is the pessimistic assessment by the Economist of the ability of 
Chinese enterprises to compete on the world stage (Economist, 18/03/04). Only 11 
Chinese companies rank in the Fortune 500 list of top global firms by revenue, and 
only two are in the FT 500, ranked by market value. Not a single Chinese brand 
makes the top 100 list of Interbrand. Although Chinese brands have achieved a lot 
over the last decade and have made tremendous progress recently in terms of 
internationalisation, compared with their global rivals, they still have much to catch 
up on, and in some aspects the gaps are even widening. This is demonstrated by 
China’s largest consumer appliance company Haier’s revenue, which in 2002 
amounted to only about 10 % of Sony’s total electronics sales, or viewed another way, 
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in 2002, the combined gross electronic systems sales of the top 30 Chinese OEMs 
represented only 64 % of HP’s total sales (Twice, 08/12/2003). In terms of 
profitability the gap is even larger. China’s domestic TV market has been dominated 
by the so-called Big Four (Changhong, TCL, Konka and Skyworth) for some years 
but the combined profits of all 20 plus Chinese TV manufacturers are less than that of 
Sony.  
However, there is also an optimistic side. Lord Saatchi says that “China is always 
going to be an important element of the global ad business… but we have been struck 
with the reverse potential: we don’t see any reason why Chinese brands cannot have 
the same impact in the US, as US brands have had in China”. He further points out 
that the laws of economics come into play in international brand development. “There 
is an economic inevitability to the process. In Stage One of a nation’s economic 
development, a country manufactures products for others; in Stage Two, it 
manufactures products to its own specifications; during Stage Three, it manufactures 
its own specifications for its own brands” (China Daily, 22/10/2004).  In the same 
way that the emergence of Japanese electronics and automotive brands in the 1960s 
and 70s and Korean brands in the 1980s and 90s challenged established and often 
complacent firms in the west, the world would expect the same of China. It is worth 
noting that many of top Chinese enterprises were barely in existence twenty years 
ago. They have all the potential and opportunities to become global players in the not 
far distant future. 
 
From advertising to branding 
The development of marketing and branding in China, since the transformation to a 
market economy started in 1978, can be roughly divided into three stages. The first in 
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the 1980s was the production stage as the country was still reeling from the problems 
of the centrally planned economy where virtually everything was in shortage. The 
consumer goods markets were all dominated by international brands and those made 
in foreign joint ventures. The 1990s was the second stage of selling and advertising. 
There were major changes in the market where supply outstripped demand in many 
sectors. Competition was intensified and price wars became common. Domestic 
companies established themselves, notably in TV and home appliance markets, taking 
market share from international brands. Advertising was widely regarded as the most 
powerful weapon after price. For a long period of time in the 1990s, Chinese 
companies confused advertising with branding in a naïve belief that advertising 
created brands; that big spending would create big brands and sales would 
automatically follow. Corporate identity was also in fashion during this period. Firms 
spent millions trying to change their logo and in promoting their new image. Many 
companies were initially ecstatic with the “successful” effect of such campaigns it 
almost all ended with tears. In 1997 Qinchi, a small brewery in Shangdong Province, 
paid RMB 320 million –five times its turnover- in a bidding for the 30 seconds slot 
the so called “golden time” immediately after the Central Television’s Evening News 
that had about 700 million viewers nationwide. The brand became instantly a 
household name and sales tripled. But the small brewery could neither meet the 
demand nor guarantee the quality. Two years later the company was close to 
bankruptcy. 
Some companies have tried innovative ways to communicate their brands to the 
market. Kejian, a mobile phone company, is a purely domestic brand. But it has found 
a unique way of developing brands through its sponsorship of Everton Football Club 
in a deal worth two million pounds sterling. Kejian does not have any business in the 
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UK and its main purpose is to use this sponsorship to influence audiences back in 
China where 93 million people watch the Premiership match every week. 
The last five years saw the start of third stage of branding and globalisation. In 
November 2001 China became a full member of the World Trade Organisation. The 
domestic market was characterised by intensified competition, mass over capacity and 
decreasing margins. Most brands in China seem to have short life cycles. The average 
life cycle of a brand is seven and half years. In 1995, more than 200 brands competed 
in the household electrical/electronics industry. In 2000 only around 20 of them 
remained in business, a mere 10% survival rate. An important sign of market maturity 
was the changes in consumers, who became better informed and more sophisticated. 
A recent survey of 600 consumers in four cities by a US consulting company 
confirmed that Chinese consumers were no longer concerned only about price. 
Quality, service and choice were the top three criteria in their purchasing decisions, 
whilst price was ranked in fifth position. They also developed loyalty to their 
preferred brands (China Quality News, 19/08/2004). Facing the changing 
environment, Chinese companies have begun to take branding more seriously but 
their understanding of the concept remains vague and superficial. There is no real 
product branding yet in China. In every campaign and every ad, it is the company that 
is promoted. The typical message would tell the firm’s history, its production 
capability and technological competence, its position as a leader and how many prizes 
it has won. What is promoted is a corporate name, rather than brand value. Without 
product branding, it is very difficult to differentiate competing offerings and there is 
no emotional desire for the consumer to buy. As a result in China, there is no brand 
competition but only sales competition, which often leads to vicious price wars. 
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The importance of branding is best captured by the words of Rita Clifton, Chairman 
of Interbrand, “He who owns the brands owns the wealth” (quoted in Marketing 
Week, 02/10/2003). The world top 100 consumer goods and retail companies relying 
on overseas production posted sales of US$3,578 bn and profits of US$228 bn. In 
contrast, the top 100 OEM manufacturers in the Asia Pacific region supplying those 
companies with products under their brands, recorded sales of only US$85 bn and 
profits of US$4bn. (Business Week 2003 Global 1000). There is an astronomical ratio 
of one to 50 between the brand owners and OEMs.  
 
Diversification: blessing or woe? 
Many Chinese companies embarked on diversification in the early 1990s when the 
fierce competition in their original business sectors drove down the margin. Take 
Haier as a typical example. The company started as small factory making 
refrigerators, later expanding into washing machines and other household appliances. 
Haier now boasts to manufacture more than 15,100 different products in 96 categories 
covering a wide range of white goods, brown goods and consumer electronics.  From 
1995 it began a wholesale diversification into totally unrelated businesses, from 
pharmaceuticals to logistics as well as catering and financial services. The company 
declared diversification and internationalisation as the two wheels of its long-term 
growth strategy.  However, most of these unrelated diversification ventures ended in 
failure after modest initial success.  
Haier is not alone in this seemingly careless pursuit for diversification. Lenovo, a PC 
maker, announced in 2003 an investment of RMB 3 billion in real estate. It is now 
hard to find a Chinese company of reasonable size that is not diversified, falling under 
the title “Jituan Gongsi” (group companies). This blind diversification does not help 
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to solve the problems in the existing business and may even indirectly serve to 
aggravate them by distracting management attention and diverting resources from its 
core business  (Kapferer, 2001). In marketing, it causes confusion amongst consumers 
in brand positioning and dilutes brand values or even damages the core business. 
Many Chinese companies do not understand multiple branding and use the same 
corporate name for various diversified products; here are two embarrassing examples. 
Huoli28, a company making washing power, sells mineral water under the same 
brand. Yuetu, a cigarette brand, diversified into making sanitary towels for women 
again using the same brand. 
Many Chinese companies see diversification as the only way for new growth in 
revenue when price wars destroyed the industry margin. This may offer an answer to 
why China is struggling to build homegrown brands (Economist, 18/03/2004). Most 
Chinese businesses are broad rather than deep, preferring to diversify rather than 
concentrating on a core business. This reflects a huge range of moneymaking 
opportunities and a lack of individual patience. The consistency and quality that 
builds trust with consumers is not part of the Chinese management style. This presents 
a paradox as the opportunist diversification strategy is in apparent conflict with 
traditional Chinese cultural values, which emphasise the long-term outlook and 
stability (Fan, 2000). Should Chinese companies hold the earlier view favouring 
conglomerates for their stability of revenues and earnings, or should they hold to the 
contemporary view in developed countries that focused companies build greater 
shareholder value? Kotler (2002a) believes the answer is the latter. He argues that all 
multinational companies today are focused companies. They stick to an industry and 
invest capital in core technologies to achieve and sustain dominance. However there 
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are exceptions. Many Japanese companies are diversified. European examples such as 
Virgin also show that conglomerates can be as successful as a focused firm.  
 
The role of government 
Realising that the development of brands is essential for the nation’s continuous 
economic growth, the Chinese government has made great efforts to help companies 
to promote their brands. By the end of 2000, brand strategy administration 
departments had been established all over the country. In 2001, the State 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), China’s 
consumer quality watchdog, promulgated regulations on the appraisal and 
management of China’s state-level top brands. Under the AQSIQ, the State 
Commission for Brand Promotion (SCBP) was set up in 2002, highlighting the role 
government ought to play in pushing forward the national branding strategy. The 
commission, composed of government officials, industrial leaders, technological 
experts and journalists, works each year to appraise new national top brands in strict 
accordance with related rules and regulations (China Daily, 06/01/04). The 
Commission organises an annual product quality appraisal. Participation to enter the 
appraisal is by voluntary application and those firms who have passed the appraisal 
will receive the title of “China’s Famous Brand”, and will be entitled to exemption of 
any further quality inspection for three years. There are now 547 brands with the title. 
However, not all the famous brands could sustain their economic performance albeit 
with the government support, and some failed the test of market competition. Nearly 
one-fifth of the 1600 companies certified as a “Famous and Old Brand” by the PRC 
government in 1990 are now on the verge of bankruptcy while just 10 % consistently 
generate profits (12/04/04 Business China, EIU). 
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Some Chinese analysts have questioned about the legality and effectiveness of such 
state intervention in commercial branding (Beijing Youth News, 16/10/2004). They 
see this as nothing but another covert way of protection leading to abuse by corrupted 
officials and businessmen. Every Chinese company each year would normally receive 
large number of invitations to participate in similar competitions or appraisals (not 
organised by SCBP). In one event, 34 participating firms all received the top prize – a 
golden cup simply because they all paid a big fee. In some other cases, the grade of 
one’s prize or merit certificate was decided entirely by the amount of contributions 
received. It is impossible to build the brand in a closed environment after Chinese 
accession to the WTO. The true powerful brands should only emerge from market 
competition via the consumer’s choice and not that of the bureaucrat. The criteria for 
the China’s Famous Brand have also been challenged. The appraisal process should 
be made open and transparent. 
However, this state intervention has an unexpected supporter in the west. Milton 
Kotler, president of Kotler Marketing Group, believes that China needs a state 
marketing policy (Kotler, 2002b). He points out that the task of a state marketing 
policy is to change the Chinese mindset from production manufacturing to brand and 
channel ownership and management. A state marketing policy will hold the key to 
post-WTO Chinese economic growth. Some key elements of a state marketing policy 
he has identified include guidance and investment support for brand and channel 
acquisition and investment in product innovation and global brand design, and 
encouraging the discipline of market research.  
Routes to internationalisation 
The following six companies were selected primarily due to their position as market 
leader in their respective sectors, as well as their demonstration of the variety of 
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strategies and approaches adopted by Chinese enterprises covering a whole spectrum 
of internationalisation, from OEM exporting to full global production and marketing. 
Each company is introduced with a brief note of its history and the emphasis is on 
their branding strategies and target market decisions. The background information 
about the six companies and their internationalisation strategies were obtained from 
various sources in Chinese including the firms’ websites, and articles from 
www.globrand.com. A summary is provided in Table 1. 
Galanz  
Galanz was set up in 1978 as a textile factory and started the manufacture of 
microwave ovens in 1993. The company has experienced rapid growth over the past 
10 years, becoming the largest microwave oven manufacturer in the world. In China, 
Galanz dominates the market with a 67 % share. In the world market the company is 
the largest OEM exporter selling more than 10 million units overseas to more than 
248 companies in 2004. Out of every 10 microwave ovens sold in the world, at least 
four were made by Galanz. The company’s policy of internationalisation is OEM first, 
branding second. The marketing director of the company was quoted of saying: 
“What is a brand? A brand is made of a pot of gold. How much gold do we have? We 
cannot afford to develop a brand in the world market at the moment so we have to do 
OEM.” Galanz’s stated goal is to become the world’s largest factory. In fact the 
company has already achieved this goal. So what is the next step? As for globalisation 
it is now or never for Galanz. The company may lose the opportunity forever if it is 
content with being an OEM exporter.  
Changhong 
Changhong was founded in 1958 as a factory producing radars for military use. The 
company started to manufacture TV in 1993 and is now one of the largest TV 
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manufacturers in the world, with products covering 13 sectors including TV, IT, air-
conditioning and digital components. Changhong sold more than 12 million TV sets 
in 2003, sharing 16 % of the domestic market and exporting to more than 90 
countries. The majority of the overseas sales are OEM with only a few exceptions. In 
Australia, Changhong sells all its products under own brand Celestial. In the last four 
years Changhong has invested heavily in Indonesia as the part of the company’s 
expansion strategy in Southeast Asia. It has built production facilities for 350,000 TV 
sets, 150,000 air conditioner units and 300,000 DVD players and set up distribution 
networks with more than 1,000 dealers across the country. The company has claimed 
that the Changhong brand has achieved a huge success in the country though no data 
of sales or market share is available. Like Galanz, Changhong has taken a cautious 
approach in overseas expansion, remaining largely an OEM exporter in the world 
market. On its website the company is still eagerly seeking new opportunities in 
OEM.  
SVA 
SVA (Group) Co. Ltd, established in 1995 after the merger of three major TV 
companies in Shanghai, has transformed itself from a conventional TV manufacturer 
into a leading electronics company with four major business units covering broadband 
value-added services, information products manufacturing, photoelectric display 
device manufacturing etc.. Apart from its technology lab in the U.S., SVA also has 
production and sales presence in nine countries around the world, including the U.S., 
Austria, Argentina and South Africa. Within China, SVA is still a relatively less 
known brand as its sales in 2003 ranked only ninth among Chinese companies at 1.15 
million units (about one tenth of the market leader Changhong). SVA’s total sales 
turnover reached 4.6 billion US$ in 2003, of which about 43% was made overseas. 
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Unlike other TV exporters in China, SVA decided to focus on upmarket products such 
as plasma TVs, TFT-LCD displays and DLP projection TVs in order to avoid the 
intense competition from other Chinese companies selling on an OEM basis at the 
low-end colour TV market. The company has proved itself by mass-producing quality 
products at low cost and made a breakthrough in the tough US market. In terms of 
marketing strategy, SVA adopted a cautious approach by working first with 
distributors to learn more about the local market rather than selling directly to big 
retailers. It also sells through the Internet outlets such as Amazon.com. The company 
used trade-level promotional activities rather than spend millions of dollars to build 
brand awareness. And their price was set at level well below the levels of its Japanese 
and South Korean competitors but above those of low price companies (Gao, et al, 
2003).  
TCL 
TCL was founded in 1981 as a small factory making tape cassettes. The company 
switched to making telephones in 1985 and became the market leader in  
China four years later.  In 1993 the company entered the TV industry and is now the 
world largest TV manufacturer with businesses from multimedia to mobile phones, 
PCs and home appliances, electrical lighting and digital products. The company has 
achieved a record of 42.65 average annual growth for the last 12 years, becoming one 
of China’s fastest growing companies. 
In contrast to Haier’s strategy, TCL decided to first test easy neighbouring markets 
such as India. In 1999 TCL chose Vietnam as the key market for overseas production 
and expansion. The company invested in three production lines, including 500,000 
TV sets and 300,000 DVD players. But it did not take too long for TCL to find that 
this “easy market” was in fact rather hard to crack. The Vietnamese consumers 
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originally believed that TCL was a Hong Kong brand. Once its origin was known, the 
brand suffered from an image problem because most Chinese products exported to 
Vietnam in previous years were cheap and of low quality. This negative perception 
proved to be very hard to overcome within a short period of time.  Facing strong 
competition from two long established rivals Sony and Samsung, TCL was struggling 
with a market share of only 10%.  
The last two years have seen a total change of direction in TCL’s international 
strategy: instead of the expensive and time-consuming effort in promoting the TCL 
brand in overseas market, the company decided to buy in international brands through 
acquisition and strategic alliances. In 2003, the company purchased the German 
company Schneider and American company Govedio. In 2004, it set up with 
Thomson, a French firm, a joint venture TTE Corporation, which will be the world’s 
largest TV manufacturer with capacity of 40 million units. It also signed an agreement 
with Alcatel to form a joint venture making mobile phones. TCL now boasts a 
portfolio of six brands. In China it uses TCL and Lehua. It has Schneider and 
Thompson in Europe, RCA and Govedio in the US. In the short term the company 
could continue to benefit from using these brands in different geographical markets 
without big investment. But this strategy is only transitional, because a) it does not 
make economic sense to maintain multiple brands in the long term; b) it could cause 
difficulty in brand positioning and confusion among the consumers. A recent example 
is Matsushita. After using dual brands Panasonic and National for more than 40 years 
the company decided to discontinue the National brand. Similarly TCL will have to 
undertake brand reduction in future, and decide if and when to promote the TCL 
brand in the world market. 
Lenovo 
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Established in 1988, Lenovo is the largest IT enterprise in China. Currently the 
company engages primarily in the sales and manufacturing of PCs, mobile handsets, 
servers and printers in China. It has been the market leader for seven consecutive 
years, commanding a 27 % share of the Chinese PC market in 2003. Lenovo was also 
ranked number one in the Asia Pacific (excluding Japan) with a market share of 12.6 
% in 2003. The company was forced to change its English name from “Legend” to 
Lenovo in 2003 after the Legend brand had been registered in various sectors in many 
countries, which made it difficult to promote its brand overseas. The new name, 
composed of two parts, namely “Le” of Legend and “novo”, which in Latin means 
novel, is intended to build an innovative image for the group worldwide.  
 
Lenovo made the first attempt in internationalisation in 2001 with the opening of 
seven overseas offices. But the campaign failed to make any real impact. In three 
years the overseas sales made up for less than 3% of the total revenue, whilst the 
share in the domestic market slipped from more than 30 % to 27 %. In February 2004 
the company announced its decision to concentrate on the domestic market, disguising 
a retreat from the international markets. In a surprise comeback move in December 
2004, Lenovo concluded the purchase of IBM’ PC division for $1.75 billion in cash, 
stock and assumed liabilities. The company was first approached by IBM in 2001 but 
said no almost right away. IBM will take an 18.9% ownership stake in the new 
company whose largest shareholder is the Chinese government with a 46% stake. 
Lenovo will relocate its world headquarters from Beijing to Armonk, N.Y. and it will 
be managed by veteran IBM executives.  It is beyond wild imagination even a few 
years ago how a potent icon of capitalism has changed its colour from blue to red 
almost overnight, the new Lenovo would become a symbol of the cooperation 
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between the East and West. According to the deal in the new company, Lenovo will 
be responsible mainly for production whilst IBM will be in charge of design, sales 
and service. Lenovo has the right of the IBM brand for five years.  This seems to be a 
good deal in which both sides get what they want – Lenovo gets a worldwide 
presence and IBM can concentrate on the high end of IT business. Lenovo’s share in 
the global PC market currently stands at 2.2%. The combined company has an 8.6% 
PC market share, in third position after Dell (16.8%) and HP (15%). The deal marks a 
gigantic step in Lenovo’s internationalisation, described as “a turtle on the back of a 
rabbit”, by the company’s chairman. Some Chinese commentators believe that this 
acquisition has accelerated Lenovo at least 10 years along the road of 
internationalisation. However, the real winner in the deal is IBM who, in partnership 
with Lenovo, gets direct access to China’s lucrative corporate market that is forecast 
to double from $24 billion in 2003 to $47.9 billion in 2008, and eventually to overtake 
Europe to become the world’s second largest IT market after the US (Business Week, 
20/12/2004).  
After the acquisition, Lenovo faces daunting tasks of integration, culture clashes and 
management changes. The new company will inevitably lose some of IBM’s 
corporate customers. The company now faces a particular dilemma in branding: 
should it invest to promote IBM or Lenovo? However the real challenge will come in 
five years time when the company can no longer use the IBM brand. Although 
Lenovo owns the Think brand but without IBM the value of the sub-brand is very 
limited. Will Lenovo itself have grown into a credible global brand? It would be 
unwise to guess the answer at this early stage, but one thing seems to be certain: To 
win the competition race in the world market place, Lenovo can’t rely on “sitting on 
the back of a rabbit” in the long term but has to transform itself into a rabbit.  
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Haier 
Haier was incorporated in 1984 producing only household refrigerators. Its German 
sounding name comes from Lieberhaier, a technology transfer partner of the company 
in its early years. In less than 20 years the company has become the world’s largest 
manufacturer of home appliance products and the fifth largest overall in the 
electronics industry. Haier currently manufactures a wide range of household 
electrical appliances, 15,100 varieties of items in 96 product lines, and exports to 
more than 160 countries. In 2004 the company has a global sales turnover of RMB100 
billion. Haier has been the market leader in the Chinese household electrical appliance 
industry, with a market share of 21 % for overall appliances, 34 % for white goods 
and 14 % for small electrical appliances. In the world market, Haier is ranked fourth 
in whitegoods (Euromonitor). Haier is the market leader in the USA for compact 
refrigerators and wine coolers, in Iran for washing machines and in Cyprus for air 
conditioners.  
 
Haier first began its overseas production in 1997, and now boasts an international 
network for design, procurement, production, distribution and after-sales services. 
The company has established 10 manufacture complexes in China, 30 factories 
overseas including the USA and Italy, 8 design centres (one in Tokyo) and 58,800 
sales agents worldwide. Haier’s international expansion can be summarised as 
walking with two legs –OEM and own branding. In the words of its CEO, we have to 
become a wolf in order to dance with wolves. Whilst still being China’s largest 
electronics OEM, Haier has been simultaneously promoting its own brand in the 
overseas markets. The Haier brand can be seen on billboards in Tokyo and New York, 
and the company has also signed a sponsorship deal with Italian Premiership football. 
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Geographically Haier’s speedy growth is attributed to its strategy of “entering a 
difficult developed market first before entering easy developing markets”. When other 
Chinese companies were trying to make inroads into neighbouring Southeast Asian 
countries in 1999, Haier invested $300 million in South Carolina to build a 
refrigerator factory. In marketing strategy the company started with small and niche 
products before expanding its product portfolio. In 2003 Haier had a 20 % share in the 
total refrigerator market in the USA (www.ukwhitegoods.co.uk, 07/03/2004). In an 
interview in 2002, the president of Haier America talked about how the company 
develops the brand in the US: “we promote Haier as a global brand – not Chinese or 
American, but global. In fact, most people think it is a German brand. Our slogan is 
‘What the World comes home to’. We are promoting the brand mostly through 
outdoor advertising, airports and magazines, like Goodhousekeeping and People. We 
also do heavy advertising in trade publications. Our goal is to build the Haier brand 
into the top five appliance manufacturers in the US. It will be GE, Whirlpool, Maytag, 
Frigidaire and Haier” (Kotler, 2002c) 
 
Discussion 
China does need to own a sizeable number of global brands for her continuous 
economic growth and prosperity. Facing problems in the domestic market of intense 
competition and overcapacity, more and more Chinese companies share the same 
understanding that they have to go global for future growth and profitability and they 
must succeed globally in order to win the domestic market. Only 10 % of China’s top 
50 firms by sales have yet to formulate an overseas expansion plan, according to a 
recent study by Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (Prystay, 2003). However, they 
differ greatly in terms of their goals and strategies. Globalisation strategy involves a 
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wide spectrum of commitment and control and requires the firm to find a fine balance 
between benefits and risk as well as long term and short-term objectives. It is clear 
from the above case examples that Chinese companies are at the different stages in 
internationalisation via different routes (Luostarinen, 1979; Cavusgil and Godiwalla, 
1982; Kim and Hwang, 1992) and this is illustrated in Figure 1. While export is the 
low cost and low risk mode overseas production offers many advantages such as 
circumventing tariff barriers and anti-dumping charges. Both Changhong and TCL 
have invested in local production with mixed results. Haier is the only Chinese firm 
that has been engaged in an all-out internationalisation that involves investment in 
activities across the whole value chain: design, production, sales and marketing, 
Galanz, at the other end of the spectrum, decided to remain (at least for the time 
being) as the OEM manufacturer. In developing a global brand Chinese companies 
could choose from a traditional or a modern approach (Ewing, et al, 2001). The 
traditional one is a conservative step-by-step approach that starts from local, to 
regional and finally global - a slow learning process. This is typified by Changhong. 
In contrast, TCL and Lenovo adopted the modern approach that accelerates 
internationalisation via joint ventures and acquisition of foreign brands, which is also 
strongly recommended by Kotler, (2002d). In target market selection, most Chinese 
companies started with the neighbouring countries in the Southeast Asia that are 
perceived to be relatively easy due to smaller geographic and psychic distance; but 
Haier took the opposite approach of tackling a more difficult market of USA first and 
has so far made some good progress. There are also significant differences in 
marketing mix strategies. Most Chinese exporters still concentrated on low end of the 
market with low price but this low pricing strategy is not always working in 
developed markets. Konka, the third-largest TV maker in China and a main rival to 
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Changhong and TCL, tried a costly push into the US market in 1999 but failed to 
make any big impact. Taking lesson from this, SVA decided to focus on high-end 
TVs with a medium pricing strategy which seemed to be working well bypassing 
direct competition from both brand competition at the top end and price competition 
at the lower end. In branding/advertising, most Chinese companies adopted a low-key 
trade promotion strategy rather than expensive above line advertising. Haier is the 
only Chinese company that spent millions of dollars in billboard advertising to build 
brand awareness in Japan and USA, but Haier promoted itself as a global brand, 
deliberately downplaying its Chinese origin. What is the best way for the Chinese 
companies to build global brands? There is no clear or simple defining method, and it 
is still too early to assess the effectiveness of different globalisation strategies as the 
impact of some recent developments remain to be seen for the years to come.  
 
Chinese companies have a long way to go in this internationalisation process, given 
the complexity, cost, uncertainty and fierce competition in creating and sustaining 
their brand names in developed markets. Compared with their Western counterparts, 
Chinese companies have competitive advantages in low cost production, sourcing, 
distribution and service. China has a vast domestic market that brings economies of 
scale and domestic rivalry. Many markets in small towns and rural areas remain 
untapped or under-developed. Chinese companies are disadvantaged in terms of their 
lack of core technology, design and innovation, branding and knowledge of managing 
large complex businesses. A lot of Chinese companies still have not truly grasped the 
art of marketing and brand building in the Western sense of the word. They are aware 
of the necessity, but not of how to do it (Marketing Week, 02/10/2003). There is a 
serious shortage of branding experts in China. Those who have experience in 
 20
international marketing are even harder to find. The biggest challenge faced by the 
Chinese companies is once they are in international markets; they will be cut off from 
the sources of most their competitive advantages that are largely derived from the low 
cost base at home. There is an urgent need for them to develop or acquire new 
competence. In an earlier study of internationalisation of five state-owned enterprises 
in China, (Young, et al, 1996) emphasise that Chinese companies have a huge process 
of education, training and cultural learning to undergo (quite apart from the initial 
capital investment requirement) if the R&D, manufacturing and marketing know-how 
acquired is to be assimilated throughout the corporation. There is no doubt that 
Chinese managers are very keen on developing new skills in marketing and branding 
but they disagree on the sources of such learning. One view advocates the wholesale 
transplant of American theory. For every problem in marketing they prefer to look for 
answers from the texts of Phillip Kotler or Jack Trout, or simply imitate Procter & 
Gamble, IBM and Siemens, regardless of the special characteristics of the Chinese 
situation. The other view rejects the need to learn Western ideas. They argue that new 
ideas from the West find their origin in ancient Chinese culture. Both views are biased 
and harmful. Chinese companies should learn from all sources and in the meantime, 
strive to develop indigenous marketing theory that combines the best of East and 
West. 
In global marketing, they could probably learn more from Japanese or Korean 
companies (Taylor, et al 2000; Cho, et al, 1994). The recent miraculous rise of 
Samsung has set a good example for Haier and others Chinese companies. It has taken 
Samsung more than 20 years to change its image from a cheap me-too brand to the 
global premium brands (Gao, et al, 2003). It would be interesting to study how 
Samsung has succeed in transforming itself into a premium global brand and why 
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other exporters in Taiwan and Hong Kong, whose economy took off at the same time 
as Japan and Korea, failed to produce a single global brand. More research is needed 
in this vital area to identify the key factors that influence the success of brand 
globalisation.  
Conclusion 
In a recent article entitled “This is the Chinese century”, William Rees-Mogg (2005), 
the former editor of the Times newspaper, writes that world economic growth and 
many economic indicators now depend on China, including the prospect of the dollar, 
the Euro, the oil price, industrial commodities, global equity markets and bond prices. 
Many Chinese companies no longer content with the role of manufacturer of cheap 
low technology goods or OEM supplier for international brands, they inspire to 
become globally recognised branded producer. The assumption has long been that the 
US and other industrialised countries will keep leading in knowledge-intensive 
industries whilst developing nations focus on lower-skill sectors. This is now open to 
debate. “What is stunning about China is that for the first time we have a huge, poor 
country that can compete both with very low wages and in high tech,” says Harvard 
economist Richard Freeman (Business Week, 30/11/2004). The recent acquisitions of 
international brands by Chinese companies, including a possible takeover of MG 
Rover by Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp. in 2005, herald not only the arrival of 
Chinese companies into the world market place but also the beginning of a long 
march to become truly global branding. Just like South Korean firms did in Seoul 
Olympics in 1988, Chinese companies have great opportunities in the next five years 
to build and promote their brands on the world stage using major events such as 
Beijing Olympics 2008 and Shanghai World Expo 2010. The rise of Chinese owned 
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global brands will help change the outside perception of Chinese products and return 
the former glory to the Made-in-China label.  
 
 
References 
Beijing Youth News, (2004), 16/10. 
Business Week, (2003) “Global 1000”. 
Business Week, (2004), 30/11, 20/12. 
China Daily, (2004), 01/06, 03/03, 22/10. 
China Quality News, (2004), 19/08. 
Cavusgil, S. T. and Godiwalla, Y. M. (1982) ‘Decision making for international 
 marketing: A comparative review’, Management Decision, 20:4. 
Cho, D., Choi, J. and Yi, Y, (1994) ‘International advertising strategies by NIC
 multinationals: the case of a Korean firm’, International Journal of 
 Advertising, 13:1. 
Economist,  (2004) Survey of China18/03. 
EIU (2004), Economist Intelligence Unit, Business China, 12/04. 
Ewing, M., Napoli, J. and Pitt, L. (2001) ‘Managing Southeast Asian brands in the 
 global economy’, Business Horizon, 44:3, 52-58 
Fan, Y. (2000) ‘A Classification of Chinese Culture’, Cross Culture Management, 
 7:2, 3-10. 
Gao, P., Woetzel, J. R. and Wu, Y., (2003) ‘Can Chinese brands make it abroad?’
 McKinsey Quarterly, Special Edition. 
Kapferer, Jean-Noel, (2001) Reinventing the Brand, Kogan Page, p154. 
Kim, W. C. and Hwang, P. (1992) ‘Global strategy and multinationals’ entry mode
 choice’, Journal of International Business Studies, 23:1, 29-53. 
Kotler, M, (2002) in www.kotlermarketing.com
a) ‘Is diversification the right strategy for Chinese companies?’ April 
 b) ‘Chinese needs a state marketing policy’, March 
c) ‘Haier in America’, April 
d) ‘Chinese companies should acquire global brands’, March 
Luostarinen, R., (1979) Internationalisation of the Firm, Helsinki: Acta Academiae
 Oeconomicae Helsinginesis 
Marketing Week, (2003), 02/10. 
Prystay, C. (2003) ‘Can China sell the world on its own brands?’ Wall Street Journal, 
 Dec. 18. 
Rees-Mogg, W, (2005), ‘This is the Chinese century’, The Times  
Root, F. R. (1987) Entry Strategies for International Markets, Lexington Books,
 Washington DC. 
Sudhaman, A, Media, June 4, 2004, pp24, Hong Kong. 
Taylor, C. R., Zou, S. and Osland, G. E. (2000), ‘Foreign market entry strategies of
 Japanese MNCs’, International Marketing Review, 17:2, 146-173. 
Twice, (2003), ‘Haier, Legend, TCL top China OEM list’, p4, 08/12. 
Young, S., Huang, C. and McDermott, M. (1996), ‘Internationalization and
 competitive catch-up process: case study evidence on Chinese multinational
 enterprises’, Management International Review, 36:4, 295-314. 
 23
Websites: 
Changhong, //en.changhong.com 
Galanz, www.galanz.com
Haier, www.haier.com
Lenovo, www.lenovo.com
SVA, www.sva.com.cn
TCL, www.tcl.com
www.globrand.com
www.ukwhitegoods.co.uk
 
 
Table 1 China’s Power Brands  
 
 Galanz Changhong SVA TCL Lenovo Haier 
 
Year of 
Establishment 
 
1978 1958 1995 1981 1988 1984 
Main products Microwave 
oven 
TVs TVs TVs, 
Mobile 
phone 
 
Computers Refrigerators, 
Appliances 
 
Brand equity 
2004 
(RMB billion) 
 
10.1 27.0 n.a. 30.6 30.7 61.6 
Slogan 
 
Easier 
cooking 
better life 
Future is 
digital 
Your needs 
we create 
Digital, 
delights 
Innovation 
and 
excellence 
Honest and 
trustworthy 
forever 
 
Revenue 2003 
(US$ billion) 
 
1.2 
 (estimate) 
6 
(estimate) 
4.6 3.4 3 9.75 
Profits 2003  
(US$ million) 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. n.a. 163 128 193 
Target 
markets 
n.a. South East 
Asia 
USA Asia and 
Europe 
Currently 
Asia 
USA and 160 
countries 
 
Market entry  
Strategy 
Indirect 
export 
Direct 
export and 
local 
production  
 
Direct 
export 
Acquisition 
and JVs 
Acquisition FDI,  
full scale 
operations 
 
Branding  OEM for  
80 foreign 
brands 
OEM and  
Changhong 
SVA Thompson, 
Schneider, 
RCA, TCL 
. 
 
Lenovo, 
IBM PC 
Haier 
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Figure 1 The Globalisation of Chinese Brands 
Source: adapted from Root (1987) 
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